Original Item. Only One Available. This is the phenomenal Command flag of Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance,  He commanded U.S. naval forces during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, one of the most significant naval battles of the Pacific Theatre. He also commanded Task Force 16 at the Battle of Midway, comprising the carriers Enterprise and Hornet. At Midway, dive bombers from Enterprise sank four larger carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Most historians consider Midway the turning point of the Pacific War. Spruance earned the nicknames “Quiet Warrior” and “Electric Brain” for his work at Midway and the Philippine Sea.

The flag is enormous, and measures roughly 56 x 82”. The four Admiral’s stars are machine stitched on, and there is a bit of fading to the blue of the flag from service use. Being dated January 1944, Spruance may have used it during the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June of that same year. It is stamped ADMIRAL FLAG SET 4 MARE ISLAND JAN. 1944. There is a tag stapled to the flag for the

NAVY RELIEF FUND AUCTION
ITEM: ADMIRALS LARGE FLAG
LOT NUMBER: 26
DONATED BY: RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE, ADMIRAL USN
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Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance was born July 3rd, 1886, in Baltimore, Maryland. He was raised in Indianapolis, Indiana. Spruance attended Indianapolis public schools and graduated from Shortridge High School. From there, he went on to graduate from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1906, and received further, hands-on education in electrical engineering a few years later. Spruance's first duty assignment was aboard the battleship USS Iowa, an 11,400-ton veteran of the Spanish–American War. In July 1907 he transferred to the battleship Minnesota and was aboard her during the historic around-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet from 1907 to 1909.

Spruance's seagoing career included command of the destroyers Bainbridge from March 1913 to May 1914, Osborne, three other destroyers, and the battleship Mississippi.

In 1916 he aided in the fitting out of the battleship Pennsylvania and he served on board her from her commissioning in June 1916 until November 1917. During the last year of World War I he was assigned as Assistant Engineer Officer of the New York Naval Shipyard, and carried out temporary duty in London, England and Edinburgh, Scotland.

Following several different commands and stations during the inter-war period, he began attendance at the Naval War College in 1926, and graduated in 1927. Spruance served as executive officer of USS Mississippi from October 1929 to June 1931. He also held several engineering, intelligence, staff and Naval War College positions up to the 1940s. He served as an instructor at the Naval War College from 1935 to 1938. He commanded the battleship USS Mississippi from April 1938 to December 1939, when he was promoted to rear admiral. On February 26, 1940, Spruance reported as commandant of the 10th Naval District with headquarters at Naval Station Isla Grande in San Juan, Puerto Rico. On August 1, 1941, he finished his tour in Puerto Rico.

In the first months of World War II in the Pacific, Spruance commanded the four heavy cruisers and support ships of Cruiser Division Five from his flagship, the heavy cruiser USS Northampton. His division was an element of the task force built around the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and commanded by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. Early on, Halsey had led his task force on hit-and-run raids against the Japanese in the western Pacific: striking the Gilbert and Marshall islands in February 1942, Wake Island in March, and projecting the air power of the Doolittle Raid against the Japanese homeland in April. These raids were critical to morale—setting a new tone of aggressiveness by U.S. commanders while providing invaluable battle experience for the commanders and sailors of the U.S. Navy.

During the third week of May 1942, U.S. naval intelligence units confirmed that the Japanese would—by early June—invade Midway Island. Capturing and occupying Midway was the brainchild-plan of commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. With it he intended to significantly expand the Imperial Japanese Navy's outer defense perimeter across the central Pacific; and, he believed, this very powerful stroke against Midway would so severely threaten Hawaii and Pearl Harbor that the U.S. government would be induced to sue for peace. On the other hand, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz knew he must intercept the Japanese invasion fleet, and that he must give battle to the enemy aircraft carriers before they could project their overwhelming power against the naval air station at Midway.

Fewer than two days before launch from Pearl Harbor, Nimitz's commander of the fleet carrier force, Admiral Halsey, was hospitalized with severe shingles; Halsey immediately recommended Admiral Spruance to Nimitz as his replacement with Admiral Fletcher receiving overall command. Although Spruance was proven as a cruiser division commander, he had no experience handling carrier-air combat; Halsey reassured Nimitz, and he told Spruance and Fletcher to rely on their newly inherited staff, particularly Captain Miles Browning, a battle-proven expert in carrier warfare. Spruance assumed command of Task Force 16 with its two carriers, USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, under battle command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Fletcher would command Task Force 17, but the task force flagship, USS Yorktown, had been badly damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the formation's other carrier, Lexington, had been sunk, but at Nimitz's behest Yorktown was patched-repaired in "rush" time purposefully to join the Midway operation.

The U.S. Navy intercept force centered on the three carriers Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown, and their air-attack squadrons. It faced a Japanese invasion fleet organized into two groups: the air-attack task force of four carriers with support ships under command of Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, and the surface and occupation forces under Admiral Nobutake Kondō and others. Admiral Yamamoto commanded the combined invasion fleet from aboard his flagship Yamato.

At 0530 June 4, a scout plane from Midway sighted the Kido Butai, however the scout only reported sighting "Two carriers and battleships", and giving course and speed. Since US intelligence had reported the possibility that the Kido Butai would be operating in two separate task forces, that meant that Fletcher only knew the location of half of the carrier force. Armed with this information, Fletcher ordered Spruance to launch a strike at the Japanese with Enterprise and Hornet while holding Yorktown in reserve in case the other Japanese carriers were discovered. Since the Japanese planes were returning from the Midway strike, Spruance ordered that his strike be launched without delay so as to maximize the chances that the Japanese carriers would be caught while landing planes or spotting the next wave. In this state the Japanese carriers would be extremely vulnerable. Furthermore, Spruance ordered that the air squadrons fly directly to their targets before assembling every squadron into a proper formation, gambling that the attacks would leave the enemy carriers in disarray and delay the launching of their own counterstrike. Though this gamble paid off, Enterprise air squadrons would pay a heavy price, flying in piece-meal and mostly without fighter escort.

The battle commenced on the morning of June 4; the first several waves of U.S. attack aircraft were badly beaten, both near Midway and at sea around the Japanese task force. Then U.S. dive bombers from Spruance's Enterprise flew to Nagumo's fleet of four carriers – which, fatefully, were without air cover. Most of Nagumo's attack planes had just returned from the first strike on Midway and were immobilized in the carrier hangars, while his combat air patrol cover planes were engaged with battling torpedo bombers from Hornet. Enterprise dive bombers critically damaged two Japanese carriers including Nagumo's flagship Akagi; while the Yorktown air group, launched after Fletcher was confident that all Japanese carriers were accounted for, crippled the Soryu. All three were eventually scuttled.

Hiryū, the surviving carrier, gave the Japanese some brief respite by sending strikes that again damaged Yorktown. But several hours later—near the end of daylight hours—a U.S. scout plane located Hiryū again. Fletcher quickly ordered his dive bombers to strike, which fatally damaged the fourth Japanese carrier; it was scuttled the next day. However a second strike from Hiryū would fatally cripple Fletcher's flagship, Yorktown and as a result, Fletcher passed command to Spruance, who would command the mop-up phase of the battle.

The U.S. Navy counterforce sank all four Japanese carriers while losing one of its own, Yorktown. The repulse of the Japanese invasion fleet at Midway, and critically the destruction of the Kido Butai, allowed the U.S. to gain parity in the naval air war. In 1949, naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison noted that Spruance was subjected to criticism for not pursuing the retreating Japanese and allowing the surface fleet to escape. But in summing up Spruance's performance in the battle, Morison wrote: "Fletcher did well, but Spruance's performance was superb. Calm, collected, decisive, yet receptive to advice; keeping in his mind the picture of widely disparate forces, yet boldly seizing every opening. Raymond A. Spruance emerged from the battle one of the greatest admirals in American naval history". For his actions at the battle of Midway, Rear Admiral Spruance was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal and cited as follows: "For exceptionally meritorious service ... as Task Force Commander, United States Pacific Fleet. During the Midway engagement which resulted in the defeat of and heavy losses to the enemy fleet, his seamanship, endurance, and tenacity in handling his task force were of the highest quality." Both Fletcher and Nimitz recommended Spruance for the Distinguished Service Medal for his role in the battle.

The Battle of Midway is considered by many to be a turning point of the war in the Pacific, along with the Guadalcanal campaign. Before Midway, a small and fractional U.S. Navy faced an overwhelmingly larger and battle-hardened Japanese Combined Fleet. After Midway, although the Japanese still held a temporary advantage in vessels and planes, the U.S. Navy and the nation gained confidence and, most critically, time. The setback in the Japanese timetable to encircle the Pacific gave the U.S. industrial machine time to crank up war production, and ultimately, to turn the advantage on Japan in the production of ships, planes, guns, and all the other matériel of war. The Battle of Midway infused the U.S. Pacific Navy with confidence. And with this battle the American forces gained, and afterwards continued to gain, hard combat experience; so the Japanese lost that crucial advantage as well.

Shortly after the Midway battle, Spruance became chief of staff to Admiral Nimitz, and in September 1942 was appointed as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

On 5 August 1943 Spruance was placed in command of the Central Pacific Force, which, on April 29, 1944, was redesignated as the Fifth Fleet. At that time, Admiral Nimitz instituted a unique arrangement in which the command of the vessels which made up the "Big Blue Fleet" alternated between Admiral William Halsey Jr., at which time it was identified as the Third Fleet and Task Force 38, and Admiral Spruance, when it became the Fifth Fleet and Task Force 58. When not in command of the fleet the admirals and their staffs were based at Pearl Harbor and planned future operations.

While screening the American invasion of Saipan in June 1944, Spruance defeated the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Although he broke the back of the Japanese naval air force by sinking three carriers, two oilers and destroying about 600 enemy airplanes (so many that the remaining Japanese carriers were used solely as decoys in the Battle of Leyte Gulf a few months later due to the lack of aircraft and aircrews to fly them) Spruance has been criticized for not being aggressive enough in exploiting his success in the Philippine Sea. Buell quotes Spruance speaking with Morison:

As a matter of tactics I think that going out after the Japanese and knocking their carriers out would have been much better and more satisfactory than waiting for them to attack us, but we were at the start of a very important and large amphibious operation and we could not afford to gamble and place it in jeopardy.

However, his actions were both praised and understood by the main persons ordering and directly involved in the battle. Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, said to him "Spruance, you did a damn fine job there. No matter what other people tell you, your decision was correct." Spruance's fast carrier commander, Marc Mitscher, told his chief of staff Arleigh Burke:

You and I have been in many battles, and we know there are always some mistakes. This time we were right because the enemy did what we expected him to do. Admiral Spruance could have been right. He's one of the finest officers I know of. It was his job to protect the landing force.

For most of the war, Spruance preferred to use the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis, named for his hometown, as his flagship. He shifted his flag to the old battleship USS New Mexico of the shore bombardment force after Indianapolis was struck by a kamikaze off Okinawa. When New Mexico was struck by two kamikaze on the night of 12 May 1945, a hasty search by Spruance's staff found the admiral manning a fire hose amidship. Determining that New Mexico was not too badly damaged to remain on station, Spruance kept her as his flagship for the rest of the campaign. Spruance later chose the battleship USS New Jersey as his flagship, as the huge Iowa-class battleship had both room for his staff and the speed to keep up with the fast carrier task forces. Spruance received the Navy Cross for his actions at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

At the end of the Second World War Congress created a limited number of five-star ranks for the Army and the Navy, designated General of the Army and Fleet Admiral. The Navy, by law, was limited to four fleet admirals; three of these appointments were obvious: Ernest King, Chester Nimitz and William Leahy. The fourth was a choice between Halsey and Spruance, and after much deliberation, eventually Halsey was appointed in December 1945. Spruance's achievements were acknowledged by the unique distinction of a special act of Congress awarding him Admiral's full pay for life.

He was appointed as Ambassador to the Philippines by President Harry S. Truman, and served there from 1952 to 1955. He received his Doctor of Jurisprudence (J.D.), honoris causa degree from Central Philippine University in 1955, an institution of higher learning founded by the American Baptist missionary, William Orison Valentine in 1905.

Spruance died in Pebble Beach, California, on December 13, 1969, and was buried with full military honors at Golden Gate National Cemetery near San Francisco.

This is one of the most outstanding flags we have ever had the privilege of offering! It likely won’t ever show up for sale again, so don’t miss it.