Original Item: Only One Available. Very early in the U.S. engagement in the Vietnam War, around 1965, the U.S. Navy employed a strategy of using U.S. crewed patrol boats in support of a South Vietnamese militia force operating sampans or junks, a kind of "hooligans navy," to cut off the flow of supplies and equipment by sea from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. North Vietnam was regularly sending small boats such as sampans (fishing boats) and trawlers down the coastline close to shore to pre-arranged rendezvous points with Viet Cong guerillas in the south to provide weapons, ammunition and other supplies. The Junk Fleet patrolled the sea coastline to interdict these North Vietnamese supply vessels. U.S. Navy officers acted as advisors to the Junk Fleet, and were able to radio for help from U.S. Navy patrol boats (mostly SWIFT boats) in support. The strategy was completely effective in choking off infiltration by sea, and the North switched over to the use of the inland waterways of the Mekong Delta to move supplies to the south from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia.

The black beret features a hand-cut "beer can" insignia for the "Junk Force" in chrome plated brass (the enlisted South Vietnamese militia men wore an all brass version) . Beret shows some wear, but it is in near perfect condition. The beret has no markings on the inside other than a size sticker, which is 56.

This is a perfect example of a rare, early Vietnam War “Junk Force” beret!

The Junk Force, officially the Coastal Force, was a naval security unit of the Republic of Vietnam, composed of civilians trained by the Navy and working in conjunction with the Republic of Vietnam National Police. The Force was formed in 1960, and integrated into the Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVNN) in 1965.

The genesis of the Coastal Force dates to April 1960, when Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), recommended that the RVNN assume a larger role in curbing the flow of enemy supplies coming into South Vietnam from the sea. Partly because of this recommendation, President Ngo Dinh Diem established the Coastal Force, often referred to as the "junk force", as an autonomous unit directly under South Vietnam’s Department of State for National Defense. The idea of a coastal force as a paramilitary unit fit in well with the Kennedy administration's belief that self-defense units represented one of the best means of fighting the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency. Consequently, the administration ordered the Defense Department to support the new force by funding the construction of 501 junks by South Vietnamese shipyards.

The original plan for the Coastal Force, written by RVNN Commander Hồ Tấn Quyền, called for 420 sailing junks and 63 motorized junks, manned by 2,200 civilian irregulars drawn from local fishing villages, to patrol the inshore coastal waters up to 5 miles (8.0 km) from the coast. Quyền hoped that his force would blend in naturally with coastal fishing junks, allowing his units to keep their true identity secret until they drew up to a suspect junk for a search and boarding mission. The plan called for creating 21 junk divisions (also known as coastal divisions), each with 23 junks. Every division would patrol a 30 miles (48 km) stretch of the South Vietnamese coastline, and their operations would be coordinated by radio from coastal command surveillance centers. Coastal divisions, in turn, reported to one of four VNN coastal districts. These districts were headquartered in Danang (I), Nha Trang (II), Vung Tau (III) and An Thoi (IV), and each district commander controlled all naval forces operating within his district. On 16 October 1963, the advisory team persuaded the RVNN to create four naval zone commands, from the 1st Naval Zone in the north to the 4th Naval Zone in the Gulf of Thailand. Thereafter, an overall commander whose area of responsibility now corresponded with that of an army corps commander controlled operations of the Sea Force, River Force and Coastal Force in a particular zone.

The genesis of the Coastal Force dates to April 1960, when Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), recommended that the RVNN assume a larger role in curbing the flow of enemy supplies coming into South Vietnam from the sea. Partly because of this recommendation, President Ngo Dinh Diem established the Coastal Force, often referred to as the "junk force", as an autonomous unit directly under South Vietnam’s Department of State for National Defense. The idea of a coastal force as a paramilitary unit fit in well with the Kennedy administration's belief that self-defense units represented one of the best means of fighting the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency. Consequently, the administration ordered the Defense Department to support the new force by funding the construction of 501 junks by South Vietnamese shipyards.

The original plan for the Coastal Force, written by RVNN Commander Hồ Tấn Quyền, called for 420 sailing junks and 63 motorized junks, manned by 2,200 civilian irregulars drawn from local fishing villages, to patrol the inshore coastal waters up to 5 miles (8.0 km) from the coast. Quyền hoped that his force would blend in naturally with coastal fishing junks, allowing his units to keep their true identity secret until they drew up to a suspect junk for a search and boarding mission. The plan called for creating 21 junk divisions (also known as coastal divisions), each with 23 junks. Every division would patrol a 30 miles (48 km) stretch of the South Vietnamese coastline, and their operations would be coordinated by radio from coastal command surveillance centers. Coastal divisions, in turn, reported to one of four VNN coastal districts. These districts were headquartered in Danang (I), Nha Trang (II), Vung Tau (III) and An Thoi (IV), and each district commander controlled all naval forces operating within his district. On 16 October 1963, the advisory team persuaded the RVNN to create four naval zone commands, from the 1st Naval Zone in the north to the 4th Naval Zone in the Gulf of Thailand. Thereafter, an overall commander whose area of responsibility now corresponded with that of an army corps commander controlled operations of the Sea Force, River Force and Coastal Force in a particular zone.